About Andre Mura

Andre M. Mura focuses his practice on consumers’ and workers’ rights, products liability, drug and medical devices, federal jurisdiction, and constitutional law. He has authored briefs filed in the U.S. Supreme Court and represented plaintiffs in appeals before the Ninth Circuit.

SCOTUS Set to Decide American Pipe Tolling For Subsequent Class Actions


Last week, the Supreme Court agreed to decide whether the tolling rule of American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), allows absent class members to bring a subsequent class action outside of a limitations period. The question is an important one to class action practice and will resolve a circuit-level split.

In American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), and Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the claims of absent class members are tolled by the timely filing of a defective class action. Does this mean that the only claims tolled are “the individual claims of purported class members?” Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 n.3 (1990). Or may purported class members also file a separate class action outside the limitations period?

That question, according to the petition for certiorari, has divided the courts of appeals, with the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits declining to toll the limitations period for such follow-on class actions, and with the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits extending the limitations period in this scenario based on American Pipe.Read more

Supreme Court Applied ‘Settled Principles’ In BMS Ruling


Leslie Brueckner of Public Justice and I just published an article in Law360 about the Supreme Court’s recent decision in  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court. Here it is in full:


The U.S. Supreme Court’s June 26 ruling in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court[1] has been characterized by some in the defense bar as portending a sea change in “specific,” or “case-linked,” personal jurisdiction. Not so fast.

Although the case was closely watched by both sides of the aisle because of its potential to strictly limit plaintiffs’ ability to sue corporations outside of their “home” state, the 8-to-1 ruling was decided on “settled principles” of law[2] — and, as a result, it did not move the legal needle anywhere near as far as the defense bar was hoping.

In this case, both California and nonresident plaintiffs sued Bristol-Meyer Squibb (BMS), a national pharmaceutical company, for personal injuries caused by Plavix, a cardiovascular drug linked to strokes and other serious injuries. Because BMS is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York, and conducts most of its operations on the East Coast, there was no basis for asserting “general,” or “all-purpose,” jurisdiction over BMS in California.[3]

Instead, the question was whether California courts could assert specific jurisdiction over BMS, which exists where the plaintiff’s claims “aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”[4]

Read more

Second Circuit Rejects “Administrative Feasibility” Requirement for Class Certification


On Friday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in In re Petrobras Securities,  issued an important ruling rejecting a “heightened” ascertainability requirement for class certification. This decision comes as the Supreme Court is being asked to hear this same legal question in a case arising out of the Ninth Circuit. Petrobas shows that any disagreement between the circuits on this issue has grown stale, and Supreme Court review is unlikely.

In Petrobas, the Second Circuit was urged to adopt a rule “under which any proposed class must be ‘administratively feasible,’ over and above the evident requirements that a class be ‘definite’ and ‘defined by objective criteria,’ and separate from Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements of predominance and superiority.” Slip op. at 28. The court, however, declined to adopt this requirement, because not only was it not required by Rule 23, it was incompatible with this rule. Id. at 35-40. Instead, ascertainability in the Second Circuit is less demanding, requiring only “that a class be defined using objective criteria that establish a membership with definite boundaries.” Id. at 28.

Many in the defense bar understood Second Circuit law differently. For example, the recent cert petition filed by defendants in Conagra Brands, Inc.Read more

The Supreme Court Puts Personal Jurisdiction On Trial


Leslie Brueckner of Public Justice and I just wrote an article for Law360 about a pair of cases before the U.S. Supreme Court concerning personal jurisdiction. You can find the article on Law360 and also below.


Remember personal jurisdiction, the topic that everyone slept through during law school? Guess what? Personal jurisdiction is no longer boring: in fact, it’s become the hottest new corporate defense strategy, particularly in the area of mass torts.

And it’s now before the U.S. Supreme Court, in two cases argued on April 25, 2017: Bristol Myers Squibb Company v. County of San Francisco (BMS) and BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell (BNSF). Unfortunately, judging from the way things went during oral argument, the outlook for plaintiffs seems bleak.

Ever since 2014, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), corporations have been raising personal jurisdiction as a threshold defense to stop injury victims from getting a hearing on the merits of their claims. And, in many cases, the courts are agreeing with them, and throwing the victims’ claims out of court.[1]

BMS and BNSF will decide the viability of that strategy — with major implication for injury victims’ ability to seek justice in a forum of their choosing.… Read more

BMS v. Superior Court Shouldn’t Affect Personal Jurisdiction in Class Actions, Solicitor General Says


We’ve been closely watching the pending U.S. Supreme Court case Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, because the personal jurisdiction question put to the Court could greatly affect where (and how) mass torts are litigated. In this case, California plaintiffs and nonresident plaintiffs are suing BMS for injuries allegedly caused by Plavix, a cardiovascular medication that the company created and marketed in the US. The Court is being asked to decide whether Bristol-Meyer Squibb’s California activities are sufficiently related to the nonresident plaintiffs‘ suits to support their invocation of specific jurisdiction in California.

A lingering question in our minds has been whether the answer to this question would also resolve questions regarding personal jurisdiction in class actions in which a single court is asked to rule on class claims of resident and non-resident plaintiffs. The (acting) Solicitor General has now filed an amicus brief in support of BMS, and his answer–No–is quite the surprise.

Here’s what the SG had to say:

The issue before the Court, as framed by Bristol-Meyers Squibb, is “whether a plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to a defendant’s forum activities when there is no causal link between the defendant’s forum contacts and the plaintiff’s claims—that is, where the plaintiff’s claims would be exactly the same even if the defendant had no forum contacts.”… Read more

Beware Intended Consequences of Class Action Reform, Too


Dave and I wrote this article for Law360, which was published today. Here it is in its entirety.

On March 8th, Law360 published an article from two class action defense lawyers who argue that the anti-class action bill currently working through Congress (known as H.R. 985) doesn’t go far enough in its quest to “stem[] class action litigation.”  They call in particular for legislation designed to mitigate the “in terrorem effect” that they insist causes corporations to “settle truly meritless claims.”

This in terrorem boogeyman has been trotted out for decades, every time that a pretext is needed to close the courthouse doors to victims of corporate abuse.  Let’s shoo away the boogeyman this time around, rather than again allowing dramatic changes to the law.  There are many good reasons to do so.

For one, studies of class actions and class settlements—including by the Federal Judicial Center—do not support the intensely negative view of litigation as blackmail.[1]  “[T]he class action is more nearly a shield than a sword.  It has protected companies from bankruptcy, but it appears to have rendered few companies insolvent, if any.”[2]

The blackmail analogy has no empirical backing. Again and again, scholars have debunked the myth that class actions foster extortionate claims.… Read more

Public Outcry As Republicans Push Radical Bill to Kill Class Actions


Here’s an update on the status of the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017 (H.R. 985), which we first touched on in an earlier post. Today, the bill was voted out of the House Judiciary Committee along party lines by a 19-12 vote, without making a single change and without holding a single hearing.

Introduced just last week, the bill has already generated sweeping opposition, including from the American Bar Association and its 400,000 attorney members, as well as consumer-, environmental-, disability-, labor- and civil-rights groups. The ABA letter opposes the bill because it would cut access to courts. The civil-rights groups’ and advocates’ letter, which includes 120 signatories, contends this “poorly drafted legislation will create needless chaos in the courts without actually solving any demonstrated problem.” The disability-rights groups did not mince words, either; “H.R. 985 would be devastating to the rights of people with disabilities.” For their part, the consumer, environmental, and labor groups’ joint letter slams the bill as “sweeping, reckless legislation” and calls the House Judiciary Committee’s consideration of this monumental bill without holding a single hearing “an outrage.”

So there you have it: a House Judiciary Committee unwilling to hold even a single hearing on radical limitations on the right of the injured and helpless to band together to seek relief in court, and a public swiftly organizing to resist.… Read more

House Republicans Push Radical Class Action Reforms


Last Wednesday, Congressman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.), Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, introduced the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017 (H.R. 985), a sweeping set of proposals that would effectively kill many class actions.

The bill proposes to:

  • require that “the party seeking to maintain such a class action affirmatively demonstrates that each proposed class member suffered the same type and scope of injury as the named class representative or representatives” (This poorly worded proposal was widely panned as the “Volkswagen Bailout Bill” when Rep. Goodlatte last introduced it in 2015, because it would have wiped away class actions and excused the worst corporate misconduct.)
  • require a class action complaint to identify whether the named plaintiff has ever been represented by class counsel before; if yes, no class action may be certified (Don’t we want plaintiffs to be represented by experienced counsel, and why does a prior representation automatically foreclose a future class proceeding where the same attorney represents the same client?)
  • restricts attorney fee awards (Courts, of course, already closely scrutinize class recoveries and attorney fee awards.)
  • limit a court’s authority to certify issue classes by requiring that “the entirety of the cause of action from which the particular issues arise satisfies all the class certification prerequisites” (Because Judge Posner is wrong that it is more efficient, “in terms both of economy of judicial resources and of the expense of litigation to the parties,” to decide some issues on a class basis rather than all issues in separate trials, see Butler v.
Read more

9th Circuit Declines to Adopt Separate “Administrative Feasibility” Requirement for Rule 23


Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 require class representatives to demonstrate that there is an administratively feasible way of identifying absent class members, in order to obtain class certification? In a major ruling, the Ninth Circuit declined to impose such a requirement, finding it incompatible with Rule 23 and not otherwise required by due process. Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 15-55727 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017).

In Briseno, the district court certified a class of consumers who purchased Wesson-brand cooking oil products labeled “100% Natural.” The class representatives alleged the “100% Natural” label was false or misleading because Wesson oils are made from
bio-engineered ingredients which, according to plaintiffs, are not natural.

On appeal, defendant ConAgra sought reversal, arguing the district court should have denied class certification because plaintiffs had failed to offer an administratively feasible way to identify absent class members. According to ConAgra, the obligation to show administrative feasibility is part of a threshold “ascertainability” prerequisite to class certification. Slip op., at 7 n.4.

In a lengthy decision written by Judge Friedland, and joined by Judge W. Fletcher and Judge Christen, the Ninth Circuit refused to impose any such requirement. The Court began by noting that the issue was one of first impression in this circuit.… Read more